Sponsors: The Dental Hospital of Zhejiang University School of Medicine
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Research presented at ESCMID Global 2026 in Munich has shown that antibiotic resistance genes (ARGs) can be present in newborns within the first hours of life, with the newborn gut becoming colonized before, during, or recently after delivery.
Meconium, the first stool passed by newborns, was traditionally thought to be sterile, explained study lead Elias Iosifidis, MD, PhD, from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in Greece. However, recent molecular studies have detected microbial genetic material in meconium samples, indicating that the neonatal gut may be exposed to bacteria during pregnancy.
It has been suggested that this early microbial exposure could contribute to the development of antibiotic resistance. Indeed, ARGs have been detected in meconium samples, and their presence at this early stage may facilitate the spread of resistance through horizonal gene transfer between bacteria.
To investigate further, Iosifidis and colleagues screened 105 meconium samples that were collected from newborns admitted to a neonatal intensive care unit within 24 hours of birth for 56 different resistance genes associated with commonly used antibiotics.
“This is the largest study of its kind exploring the effect of hospital environment on the collection of ARGs in the neonatal gut,” said lead author Argyro Ftergioti. “We analyzed meconium samples within the first 72 hours of life to capture the earliest snapshot of microbial and genetic exposure in newborns. At this stage, the collection of resistance genes is mainly shaped by maternal transmission, delivery mode, and very early hospital exposures.”
The most frequently detected ARGs were oqxA, a gene that causes resistance to fluoroquinolones (like ciprofloxacin), olaquindox, chloramphenicol, and tigecycline, and qnrS, which contributes to decreased susceptibility to quinolones. These were found in 98% and 96% of samples, respectively.
The study also identified several genes encoding beta-lactamases, enzymes that cause resistance to beta-lactam antibiotics such as penicillins and cephalosporins. Among these, the most prevalent were blaCTXM (55%), blaCMY (51%), and blaSHV (39%). Genes linked to carbapenem resistance (KPC/NDM/GES/VIM), a last-line class of antibiotics, were detected in 21% of samples.
Each sample contained a median of eight resistance genes.
“This finding suggests that a pattern of ARGs is already established at this stage. The neonatal gut harbors a diverse resistome, and the presence of clinically important ARGs so early in life is concerning,” said Ftergioti. “Although some ARGs were expected, their high prevalence across the majority of samples was striking—particularly for clinically critical genes offering carbapenem resistance.”
The team also found associations between resistance genes and several maternal and neonatal factors. The presence of the msrA (macrolide-streptogramin resistance) gene was linked with maternal hospitalization during pregnancy, while a higher number of resistance genes was associated with central venous catheter placement within the first 24 hours of life. Both findings likely reflect exposure to healthcare-associated microbes in hospital settings.
“Surprisingly, resuscitation shortly after birth was associated with fewer resistance genes,” noted Ftergioti. He cautioned, however, that “this finding should be interpreted carefully, as it may reflect differences in early microbial exposure or other clinical factors.”
Overall, the data suggest that both maternal transmissions and early exposure to the hospital environment may contribute to the establishment of ARGs in the neonatal gut.
“While further research is needed to understand how early carriage of resistance genes affects microbiome development and infection risk, these findings highlight the importance of surveillance, infection prevention and control in neonatal care,” Ftergioti concluded.
The post Antibiotic Resistance Genes Established Early in Newborns appeared first on Inside Precision Medicine.
Leanna Stokes had gotten into the habit of asking her oncologist what might be next for her treatment, and for good reason. Stokes, a 36-year-old gymnastics manager from New Rochelle, New York, had received one of the most difficult diagnoses in oncology: metastatic pancreatic cancer. Her oncologist kept mentioning two syllables, KAY-ras, referring to her cancer’s mutation on the KRAS gene. Mutations in this gene can make cancers more aggressive. But for Stokes, it was a possible key to extending her life.
“She always mentioned this — KRAS, KRAS, KRAS,” Stokes said of her oncologist. As Stokes proceeded to receive line after line of chemotherapy, she would remind herself, “It’s there. It’s there. It’s there. Then finally, it was my turn.”
Just a few years ago, such a refrain might have sounded odd to pancreatic cancer experts. For most of the nearly 50 years since KRAS was first discovered, scientists struggled to effectively drug the cancer protein. When Kevan Shokat, a biochemist at University of California, San Francisco, finally discovered how to drug a rare subset of KRAS mutant cancers, the first-generation drugs were a clinical disappointment. For the roughly 1% of pancreatic cancer patients who could receive them, the drugs improved outcomes only marginally, with resistance forming rapidly.
“We did not have a home run on the first effort,” said Channing Der, a pancreatic cancer researcher at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. “It’s fair to say we’ve been disappointed by the durability of the responses.”
But once Shokat had shown it could be done at all, more and more companies jumped into developing drugs for KRAS, with new agents now regularly moving into clinical trials. The company leading the field has been Revolution Medicines, with the drug daraxonrasib, which targets KRAS and related proteins.
This was the drug that Stokes got on her clinical trial. It transformed her life, she said, enabling her to live far longer than most patients with her diagnosis. It’s also generating immense excitement among oncologists and drug developers, who say it heralds a new era for pancreatic cancer medicine and could bring new treatments for other cancer types with KRAS mutations including lung, colorectal, endometrial, and more. Beyond Revolution Medicines, dozens of other companies are also testing promising KRAS inhibitors in the clinic.
On April 6, cancer patients at Brockton Hospital in Massachusetts showed up for chemotherapy infusions and were told to go home. The hospital’s information systems had been hit by a cyberattack. The ER closed. Ambulances were diverted. Staff switched to paper records. Patients were told to call back later to reschedule their treatment.
This wasn’t the first time that this kind of incident has happened. In May 2024, the Ascension ransomware attack took down systems across 136 hospitals for six weeks. That same year, the Change Healthcare breach compromised the personal health information of 100 million Americans, roughly one in three people in the country, and disrupted billing and authorization systems so severely that physician practices warned they might have to close their doors. After the Change breach, an AHA survey of nearly 1,000 hospitals found that 74% reported direct impact on patient care.
The availability of artificial intelligence for use in warfare is at the center of a legal battle between Anthropic and the Pentagon. This debate has become urgent, with AI playing a bigger role than ever before in the current conflict with Iran. AI is no longer just helping humans analyze intelligence. It is now an active player—generating targets in real time, controlling and coordinating missile interceptions, and guiding lethal swarms of autonomous drones.
Most of the public conversation regarding the use of AI-driven autonomous lethal weapons centers on how much humans should remain “in the loop.” Under the Pentagon’s current guidelines, human oversight supposedly provides accountability, context, and nuance while reducing the risk of hacking.
But the debate over “humans in the loop” is a comforting distraction. The immediate danger is not that machines will act without human oversight; it is that human overseers have no idea what the machines are actually “thinking.” The Pentagon’s guidelines are fundamentally flawed because they rest on the dangerous assumption that humans understand how AI systems work.
Having studied intentions in the human brain for decades and in AI systems more recently, I can attest that state-of-the-art AI systems are essentially “black boxes.” We know the inputs and outputs, but the artificial “brain” processing them remains opaque. Even their creators cannot fully interpret them or understand how they work. And when AIs do provide reasons, they are not always trustworthy.
In the debate over human oversight, a fundamental question is going unasked: Can we understand what an AI system intends to do before it acts?
Imagine an autonomous drone tasked with destroying an enemy munitions factory. The automated command and control system determines that the optimal target is a munitions storage building. It reports a 92% probability of mission success because secondary explosions of the munitions in the building will thoroughly destroy the facility. A human operator reviews the legitimate military objective, sees the high success rate, and approves the strike.
But what the operator does not know is that the AI system’s calculation included a hidden factor: Beyond devastating the munitions factory, the secondary explosions would also severely damage a nearby children’s hospital. The emergency response would then focus on the hospital, ensuring the factory burns down. To the AI, maximizing disruption in this way meets its given objective. But to a human, it is potentially committing a war crime by violating the rules regarding civilian life.
Keeping a human in the loop may not provide the safeguard people imagine, because the human cannot know the AI’s intention before it acts. Advanced AI systems do not simply execute instructions; they interpret them. If operators fail to define their objectives carefully enough—a highly likely scenario in high-pressure situations—the “black box” system could be doing exactly what it was told and still not acting as humans intended.
This “intention gap” between AI systems and human operators is precisely why we hesitate to deploy frontier black-box AI in civilian health care or air traffic control, and why its integration into the workplace remains fraught—yet we are rushing to deploy it on the battlefield.
To make matters worse, if one side in a conflict deploys fully autonomous weapons, which operate at machine speed and scale, the pressure to remain competitive would push the other side to rely on such weapons too. This means the use of increasingly autonomous—and opaque—AI decision-making in war is only likely to grow.
The science of AI must comprise both building highly capable AI technology and understanding how this technology works. Huge advances have been made in developing and building more capable models, driven by record investments—forecast by Gartner to grow to around $2.5 trillion in 2026 alone. In contrast, the investment in understanding how the technology works has been minuscule.
We need a massive paradigm shift. Engineers are building increasingly capable systems. But understanding how these systems work is not just an engineering problem—it requires an interdisciplinary effort. We must build the tools to characterize, measure, and intervene in the intentions of AI agents before they act. We need to map the internal pathways of the neural networks that drive these agents so that we can build a true causal understanding of their decision-making, moving beyond merely observing inputs and outputs.
A promising way forward is to combine techniques from mechanistic interpretability (breaking neural networks down into human-understandable components) with insights, tools, and models from the neuroscience of intentions. Another idea is to develop transparent, interpretable “auditor” AIs designed to monitor the behavior and emergent goals of more capable black-box systems in real time.
Developing a better understanding of how AI functions will enable us to rely on AI systems for mission-critical applications. It will also make it easier to build more efficient, more capable, and safer systems.
Colleagues and I are exploring how ideas from neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy—fields that study how intentions arise in human decision-making—might help us understand the intentions of artificial systems. We must prioritize these kinds of interdisciplinary efforts, including collaborations between academia, government, and industry.
However, we need more than just academic exploration. The tech industry—and the philanthropists funding AI alignment, which strives to encode human values and goals into these models—must direct substantial investments toward interdisciplinary interpretability research. Furthermore, as the Pentagon pursues increasingly autonomous systems, Congress must mandate rigorous testing of AI systems’ intentions, not just their performance.
Until we achieve that, human oversight over AI may be more illusion than safeguard.
Uri Maoz is a cognitive and computational neuroscientist specializing in how the brain transforms intentions into actions. A professor at Chapman University with appointments at UCLA and Caltech, he leads an interdisciplinary initiative focused on understanding and measuring intentions in artificial intelligence systems (ai-intentions.org).